For individuals with a background in traditional IT or IT security, stepping into the world of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security can feel overwhelming. The tools, techniques, and perspectives that work well in conventional IT often don’t apply to SCADA/ICS environments. This article outlines some of the most significant distinctions between securing traditional IT systems and SCADA/ICS systems.

Safeguarding Data vs. Ensuring Process Continuity

In traditional IT security, the main objective is to protect sensitive information. This includes intellectual property, financial details like credit card numbers, emails, and personal data such as personally identifiable information (PII). The focus is on preventing hackers from accessing or stealing this confidential content.

SCADA/ICS systems, however, shift the priority to safeguarding the operational process. These systems are built for constant, uninterrupted functioning, and any stoppage can have major consequences. For example, shutting down a facility might require weeks or months to recover, costing millions in lost productivity. Beyond financial losses, outages in critical systems—like power generation, electricity distribution, or water treatment—can create serious disruptions, potentially endangering lives. A small failure, such as a defective valve or sensor, can also trigger a domino effect, leading to catastrophic breakdowns. The 2005 Texas City refinery explosion, caused by a faulty pressure-relief valve, resulted in 50 deaths and billions in damages for British Petroleum, underscoring this risk.

In short, while traditional IT security centers on data protection, SCADA/ICS security is all about keeping the process running smoothly.

Availability is a cornerstone of security in both traditional IT and SCADA/ICS contexts, but it’s far more critical in the latter. Because SCADA/ICS systems prioritize process protection, taking them offline for updates or fixes isn’t always practical. Patching or rebooting might only happen during planned maintenance periods, such as quarterly or yearly shutdowns. This can leave systems exposed to known vulnerabilities for months or even years. Unlike traditional IT, where immediate patches are often a go-to solution, SCADA/ICS engineers must lean on alternative strategies, known as compensating controls, to reduce risks.

Physical Access Challenges

In most traditional IT settings, security teams have hands-on access to hardware like servers and networking gear. SCADA/ICS systems, however, often span vast distances—think pipelines or power grids stretching across hundreds or thousands of miles. This spread makes it harder to apply security measures consistently and amplifies the need for robust physical security. Unprotected remote locations, like field stations, can become weak points that attackers exploit to infiltrate the entire system.

From Obscurity to Exposure

For years, SCADA/ICS systems enjoyed a layer of protection known as “security through obscurity.” Their limited visibility and the niche expertise required to interact with them kept them off most attackers’ radars, often leaving them without even basic security features. However, as these systems have connected to the internet—typically via TCP/IP for remote monitoring—this advantage has faded. Tools like Shodan, which scan for internet-connected devices, have further exposed them.

The industry is now playing catch-up, working to implement stronger security practices. A key hurdle is that many standard security tools don’t support the proprietary protocols common in SCADA/ICS setups, requiring tailored solutions like custom firewalls or intrusion detection systems. With rising threats like cyberterrorism and warfare—exemplified by Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s power grid—the urgency to secure these systems has never been greater. In any major cyber conflict, SCADA/ICS infrastructure is likely to be a prime target.